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CONTENT, PURPOSE, OR BOTH? 
Rebecca Tushnet* 
Abstract: Most debates about the proper meaning of “transformativeness” in fair use are 
really about a larger shift towards more robust fair use. Part I of this short Article explores 
the copyright-restrictionist turn towards defending fair use, whereas in the past critics of 
copyright’s broad scope were more likely to argue that fair use was too fragile to protect free 
speech and creativity in the digital age. Part II looks at some of the major cases supporting 
that rhetorical and political shift. Although it hasn’t broken decisively with the past, current 
case law makes more salient the freedoms many types of uses and users have to proceed 
without copyright owners’ authorization. Part III discusses some of the strongest critics of 
liberal fair use interpretations, especially their arguments that transformative “purpose” is an 
illegitimate category. Part IV looks towards the future, suggesting that broad understandings 
of transformativeness are here to stay. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Professor Tony Reese presciently told us that the case law on 
fair use transformativeness favored protecting transformative purpose 
over transforming content, so that, among other things, exact 
reproduction could have a very good shot at fair use.1 Since then, 
defendants who made exact copies with transformative purposes 
(according to the courts) have done extremely well, while the record of 
unauthorized transformed content is somewhat more mixed, though also 
increasingly favorable. Purpose-transformativeness, where a work is 
reproduced wholesale or nearly so, but in a different context—such as a 
news report about a controversial artwork that contains an image of that 
artwork—is regularly enough to justify a finding of fair use. Content-
transformativeness, where a work is physically altered, can also lead to a 
*  Professor, Georgetown Law; co-founder, Organization for Transformative Works. 
1. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 467, 494 (2008). 
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fair use finding where the meaning is changed substantially as a result. 
The case law is consistent with a broader cultural recognition of the 
value of fair use of many flavors. As a founder of the nonprofit 
Organization for Transformative Works (OTW),2 which works to 
preserve and protect noncommercial fanworks—including fanworks 
based on existing copyrighted works—I have a deep commitment to 
both purpose-transformativeness and content-transformativeness, since 
fanworks regularly perform both kinds of transformations. I have seen 
fans exercise their fair use rights with increasing resolve, and the 
concept of transformativeness has helped them articulate and defend 
their creations. 
Most debates about the proper meaning of transformativeness are 
really about this larger shift towards more robust fair use. 
Transformativeness has indeed become almost synonymous with 
fairness, as critics of broad fair use findings charge. Yet those critics’ 
underlying dispute is with fairness, not with transformativeness: they are 
uncomfortable with fair use findings in favor of exact copies, or 
sometimes in favor of inexact copies made with different but noncritical 
purposes. 
The changing ways in which transformativeness has been invoked 
provide an example of what Professor Jack Balkin has called 
“ideological drift,” in which “legal ideas and symbols will change their 
political valence as they are used over and over again in new contexts.”3 
More broadly, fair use itself has undergone a process of ideological drift, 
with people disagreeing about whether the meaning of fair use has been 
fundamentally altered by newer applications, or whether the concept 
remains the same but the facts to which it has been applied have 
systematically changed.4 Balkin could have been channeling fair use’s 
current critics when he wrote that “we are likely to see the phenomenon 
of ideological drift at work when individuals complain that ‘a good idea 
has been taken too far,’ or that we must return to the ‘original reasons’ 
behind a doctrine or a symbol.”5 These disputes matter because legal 
concepts are both tools that help us understand the world and also 
themselves contested ground: 
The parties fight on a battlefield in which the shape of the terrain 
2. ORG. FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS, www.transformativeworks.org (last visited Apr. 24, 
2015). 
3. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 871 
(1993). 
4. Cf. id. at 871–72 (describing similar processes in other legal fields).   
5. Id. at 872–73.   
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itself is a potential prize. Ideological drift, in this sense, is the 
effect of a deeper cause—the struggle over cultural and political 
meaning through the practice of politics and persuasion, whose 
reward is ideological and rhetorical power.6 
Part I of this short Article explores the copyright-restrictionist turn 
towards defending fair use, whereas in the past critics of copyright’s 
broad scope were more likely to argue that fair use was too fragile to 
protect free speech and creativity in the digital age. Part II looks at some 
of the major cases supporting that rhetorical and political shift. Although 
it hasn’t broken decisively with the past, current case law makes more 
salient the freedoms many types of uses and users have to proceed 
without copyright owners’ authorization. Part III discusses some of the 
strongest critics of liberal fair use interpretations, especially their 
arguments that transformative “purpose” is an illegitimate category. Part 
IV looks towards the future, suggesting that purpose-transformativeness 
is here to stay alongside content-transformativeness, and for good 
reason. 
As in other instances of ideological drift, changing terminology is 
unlikely to change anyone’s substantive agreement or disagreement with 
the relevant outcomes. Even if we abandoned transformativeness as an 
overriding fair use category, we would still face the same disputes over 
which uses should be deemed productive or otherwise fair. I am 
confident that both content-transformativeness and purpose-
transformativeness have important roles to play in the fair use 
ecosystem. Critics charge that fair use is unpredictable and inconsistent 
with the rest of copyright law, but—like many a building material—a 
doctrine can be both flexible and also strong enough to support reliance. 
So too with fair use. By embracing transformative fair use’s broad scope 
and diversity, we can defend it against critics who argue that 
transformativeness has become meaningless or contradictory. 
I. LET US NOW PRAISE FAIR USE 
The political valence of transformativeness, and fair use in general, 
has changed substantially since the early years after Campbell v. Acuff 
Rose Music, Inc.7 At that time, copyright low-protectionists like Diane 
Lenheer Zimmerman were skeptical of Campbell’s transformativeness 
6. Id. at 877. This is not simply a power struggle, but rather a dispute over the right thing to do 
and even over how to determine what the right thing to do is in any given situation. Id. at 877–78; 
see also id. at 889 (discussing the deep sincerity of belief that can coexist with ideological drift).  
7. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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test,8 which elevated transformation—the creation of new meaning, 
message, or purpose—as a key element of fair use. The concept of 
transformativeness seemed potentially unstable, especially given the 
Court’s unnecessary and ahistorical distinction between favored 
“parody” and less-favored “satire.”9 I worried that a focus on 
transformativeness would devalue exact copying, which is often 
important to particular expressive purposes.10 And Larry Lessig 
famously described fair use as “the right to hire a lawyer,” charging that 
the doctrine chilled new expression and valuable uses by creating 
uncertainty.11 
How, then, did fair use go from weak reed to powerful shield in a 
decade’s time?12 As the next Part will explain in more detail, 
transformativeness developed into an extremely versatile concept as 
lower courts applied it to situations far afield of the mocking song in 
Campbell. Defendants won significant fair use cases, and a fair use 
advocacy bar developed, including public intellectuals defending the 
rights of people who would rarely litigate a fair use defense.13 My focus 
in this Part, however, is on the rhetoric surrounding fair use outside of 
the courts. Very few potential disputes are ever litigated, even in the 
lawsuit-happy U.S., and therefore claims of right and understandings 
about the law outside the courts are far more important in practice than 
8. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem “Transformed”: 
Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251, 262 (1998). 
9. See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing: Parody 
Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 982–99 (2004) (detailing absence of historical or 
theoretical warrant for parody/satire distinction in copyright). 
10. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 555–60 (2004). 
11. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) (“[I]n America fair use simply means the 
right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”). 
12. Though statements about uncertainty can still be found. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Clay 
Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness 
Twenty Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92, 95 (2014) (“In 
the immediate aftermath of Campbell and its reception in the lower courts, one perceptive scholar 
described the doctrine of transformative use as ‘a scrambled mess.’ Unfortunately, in the ensuing 
two decades, the ambiguity surrounding the doctrine has, if anything, increased.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
13. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org (last 
visited May 5, 2015), and Stanford’s Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation Clinic, STAN. 
L. SCH. JUELSGAARD INTELL. PROP. & INNOVATION CLINIC, https://www.law.stanford.edu/ 
organizations/clinics/juelsgaard-intellectual-property-and-innovation-clinic (last visited May 5, 
2015), are only two of the public interest organizations and law school clinics that now support pro 
bono representation in fair use cases. 
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the law on the books.14 
The public discourse on fair use changed, in part in response to 
favorable court decisions, but also in significant part because some 
activists and institutions emerged as norm entrepreneurs, encouraging 
people to believe in and depend on fair use for their activities.15 The 
development of large businesses reliant on fair use,16 nonprofit public 
interest groups devoted to protecting fair use,17 and activist educators 
and artists depending on fair use18 interacted with case law to make fair 
use far more robust and reliable than I once feared. 
Today, public intellectuals are happy to explain to the general public 
that transformativeness protects a wide range of activities.19 A number of 
academics have identified patterns in fair use cases that can be used to 
predict outcomes and make judgment calls in ordinary practice.20 Peter 
14. See LAURA J. MURRAY, S. TINA PIPER, & KIRSTY ROBERTSON, PUTTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN ITS PLACE: RIGHTS DISCOURSES, CREATIVE LABOR, AND THE EVERYDAY 2 (2014) 
(explaining that even when statutory and case law is readily available, “people actually choose to 
understand the law through information and opinion gathered from friends, strangers, coworkers, 
and the media”). 
15. See Sepehr Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 273, 322–23 (2015) (“There are many who actively work, not without considerable success, 
to improve fair use by helping to shape copyright litigation in the federal courts. The list includes 
the Center for Democracy and Technology, Chilling Effects, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the 
Free Software Foundation, the NYU Technology Law and Policy Clinic, Public Knowledge, and the 
Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, among many others. These organizations and 
their law-professor members bring lawsuits, defend lawsuits, write amicus briefs, compile facts, and 
issue reports to raise judicial awareness of copyright abuses and alert judges to the downside of 
copyright expansionism.” (footnotes omitted)). 
16. See THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: 
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (2011), available at 
http://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/library/CCIA-FairUseintheUSEconomy-2011.pdf 
(study prepared for Computer & Communications Industry Association). 
17. The OTW is one of these, along with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. What We Believe, 
ORG. FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS, http://transformativeworks.org/about/believe (last visited 
May 16, 2015) (“We believe that fanworks are transformative and that transformative works are 
legitimate. . . . We envision a future in which all fannish works are recognized as legal and 
transformative and are accepted as a legitimate creative activity.”). 
18. Most prominently represented by the best practices in fair use movement spearheaded by 
Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi. See Best Practices, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT, 
http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair-use/best-practices (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
19. See, e.g., BRANDON BUTLER, http://brandonbutler.info/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2015); 
DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT, http://www.project-disco.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2015); 
REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG, http://tushnet.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
20. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1525 (2004) (detailing a number of predictable patterns); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making 
Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 718 (2011) (arguing that there are “patterns in 
fair use case law that give the doctrine some measure of coherence, direction, and predictability”); 
Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012) (listing factors empirically useful in 
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Jaszi and Pat Aufderheide’s initiative to create best practices in fair use 
among nonlawyer practitioners in particular fields has seen ever-
increasing success.21 The clearest example comes from the statement of 
fair use best practices for documentary filmmakers, which enabled 
filmmakers to get insurance and distribution while relying on fair use, 
when once “clearance culture” gatekeepers would have demanded that 
every image and sound be licensed.22 As Jaszi and Aufderheide say, fair 
use is a muscle that needs to be used to stay in shape23—and, we might 
extend the analogy, it gets larger and more defined with vigorous use. 
The political utility of claiming that fair use is uncertain has therefore 
now shifted. Critics of copyright’s seemingly ever-expanding scope used 
to say that fair use wasn’t enough to protect the public interest, and 
proponents of expansion used to reassure them that fair use (and the 
idea/expression distinction) made any expansion harmless.24 Now, by 
contrast, copyright expansionists use fair use’s supposed unreliability as 
a reason why fair use shouldn’t actually be considered that important or 
useful to users or subsequent creators.25 Copyright restrictionists today 
often resist the charge of unpredictability in order to make fair use’s 
predicting outcomes); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541 
(2009) (fair use case law is “both more coherent and more predictable than many commentators 
have perceived”). 
21. See generally PETER JASZI & PAT AUFDERHEIDE, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT 
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2011); Best Practices, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT, 
http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair-use/best-practices (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (collecting a number 
of fair use best practices statements). 
22. See Robert Kasunic, E&O Insurance for Documentary Films: The Effect of Best Practices in 
Fair Use, INTELL. PROP. L. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n Tort Trial & Ins. Practice, 
Chicago, Ill.), Summer 2008, at 1, available at http://www.kasunic.com/Articles/ipsummer08.pdf. 
23.  PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA 28 
(2004), available at http://centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_ 
Report.pdf (quoting documentarian Sam Green). 
24. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–90 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (reasoning that fair use “affords considerable latitude for scholarship and 
comment” even after copyright term extension). 
25. See, e.g., June M. Besek, Jane C. Ginsburg, & Philippa S. Loengard, Comments on ALRC 
Discussion Paper 79, Copyright and the Digital Economy 3 (July 31, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344338 (“[The 
flexibility of fair use] in many instances comes at the cost of certainty and predictability . . . . [F]air 
use decisions are often complicated, and advice frequently depends as much on the amount of risk 
the user is willing to undertake as it does on the evaluation of the substantive law.”); see also 
GEOFFREY A. MANNE & JULIAN MORRIS, DANGEROUS EXCEPTION: THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF 
INCLUDING “FAIR USE” COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 15, 17 (2015), 
available at http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/dangerous_exception_final.pdf (arguing that 
other legal systems aren’t able to handle subtle, common-law fair use inquiries and that other 
countries would misinterpret fair use to protect too much activity). 
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reliability a performative reality. This statement, provided by Brandon 
Butler, Michael Carroll, and Peter Jaszi as part of a Copyright Office 
inquiry into orphan works proposals, states the basic thesis: 
Myth: Fair use is unpredictable, and people who are not highly 
risk tolerant need more certainty than fair use currently provides. 
Representatives of the Copyright Office asked repeatedly 
whether the flexibility of the four-factor framework is a 
hindrance to all but the most courageous, risk-tolerant actors, 
and rights holders claimed there was widespread confusion 
about what constitutes fair use. 
Fact: Fair use has become a stable, predictable, coherent 
doctrine. The courts are applying a unified view of fair use 
grounded in the concept of transformativeness, first suggested 
by Judge Leval and endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1994, and 
for many common categories of use it is possible to make 
powerful predictions about how a court will assess specific 
examples. There are more and more tools available to users to 
help them make these determinations, including best practices 
statements developed by user communities. In reality, more and 
more people and institutions are relying on fair use on a daily 
basis, and only the myth of an arbitrary and capricious fair use 
doctrine is preventing others from joining them.26 
Or, as Professor Jaszi more bluntly put it before Congress: “Fair use 
is working.”27 There is no such thing as perfect certainty—in America, 
after all, one can imagine people suing over virtually anything, 
copyright-related or not. But fair use provides enough certainty that 
ordinary people can go about their day-to-day business using common 
sense, just as they can usually do so with respect to other incompletely 
specified legal regimes, such as negligence liability in tort. 
II. THE TRIUMPH OF TRANSFORMATIVE EXACT COPIES 
Alongside fair use’s robust new public persona, litigated fair use 
26. BRANDON BUTLER, MICHAEL CARROLL, & PETER JASZI, IN RE: DOCKET NO. 2012–12, 
ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION 1–2 (2014), available at http://copyright.gov/orphan/ 
comments/Docket2012_12/Butler-Brandon-Carroll-Michael-Jaszi-Peter.pdf (footnotes omitted). 
27. The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) (testimony of Professor Peter Jaszi, 
Washington College of Law American University, Washington, D.C.). But see Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Copyright’s Private Ordering and the “Next Great Copyright Act,” 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1595, 
1602–05 (2014) (arguing that claims of predictability are overstated, at least for ordinary 
commercial uses). 
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defenses have prevailed in situations of great relevance to ordinary 
Americans and specialists alike, from search engines to critics of 
particular public figures. Specifically, exact copying plus transformative 
purpose has a stunningly good fair use record in recent cases. Copies, 
both large-scale and selective, have been blessed as transformative by 
courts reasoning that exact copies can still have transformative purposes 
distinct from the purpose of authorized copies. This Part sketches out the 
variety in the case law and its underlying justification in transformative 
purpose. 
Beginning with the large, indiscriminate copiers: databases for 
detecting plagiarism,28 tracking the news,29 aggregating legal briefs,30 
and aggregating the text of millions of libraries’ books31 have been held 
to be fair use mostly because of their transformativeness, even in the 
presence of a commercial purpose. Why are large-scale copying 
endeavors transformative? As the Second Circuit explained in Authors 
Guild Inc. v. HathiTrust,32 
[T]he creation of a full-text searchable database is a 
quintessentially transformative use. . . . [T]he result of a word 
search is different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, 
and message from the page (and the book) from which it is 
drawn. Indeed, we can discern little or no resemblance between 
the original text and the results of the [HathiTrust database] full-
text search.33 
Interpreting this result, a district court concluded in Fox News 
Network LLC v. TVEyes Inc.34 that “[t]ransformation almost always 
occurs when the new work ‘does something more than repackage or 
republish the original copyrighted work.’”35 There are two ways to read 
this statement: that doing something more than repackaging or 
publishing is almost always transformative, or that transformativeness 
can rarely be found unless the new work does something more than 
repackaging and republishing. As discussed in Part III, fair use critics 
28. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
29. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
30. White v. West Publ’g Corp., No. 12 CIV. 1340 JSR, 2014 WL 3057885 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 
2014). 
31. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
32. 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
33. Id. at 97. 
34. 43 F. Supp. 3d 379. 
35. Id. at 390. 
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fear that the former reading is becoming predominant, to the detriment 
of copyright owners’ legitimate interests in controlling and monetizing 
their works. No matter which reading is correct, however, creating a new 
work that is greater than the sum of its parts has been regularly 
recognized as transformative. In TVEyes, for example, the court found 
transformativeness when an aggregator of radio and TV news allowed its 
users to study the tone of reporting.36 According to the court, “TVEyes’ 
message, ‘this is what they said’—is a very different message from [Fox 
News’]—‘this is what you should [know or] believe.’”37 
Selective copying without alteration of the content of the copied work 
has also succeeded. Instances of copying deemed to be fair use include: 
law firm copying of scientific journal articles for purpose of patent 
disclosures,38 copying an expert’s resume for litigation-related 
communications,39 copying blog posts for use in a disciplinary 
proceeding against the blogger,40 copying a conference call in order to 
convey executives’ tone and wording,41 copying music posters as part of 
a history of the music group,42 copying an alleged ex-Muslim radical’s 
speeches to expose his fraud,43 and even copying photos of people who 
were being criticized.44 
36. Id. at 392. 
37. Id. at 393 (quoting Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 85 (2d 
Cir. 2014)) (alterations in original). Jonathan Band suggests that this is similar to the hearsay rule, 
which treats statements differently for the purpose of proving they were said versus proving the 
truth of the matter asserted. Jonathan Band, Transformative Use and the Hearsay Rule, DISRUPTIVE 
COMPETITION PROJECT (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/091114-
transformative-use-hearsay-rule/. 
38. Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 6242843 (N.D. Tex. 
Dec. 3, 2013) (finding patent-related copying transformative and fair). 
39. Devil’s Advocate LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:13-CV-1246, 2014 WL 7238856, at *5 
(E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2014) (“[D]efendant’s submission of Toothman’s resume in the Texas case was 
for the purpose of providing notice in a judicial proceeding, a purpose different from the resume’s 
intrinsic commercial purpose.”). 
40. Denison v. Larkin, No. 1:14-CV-01470, 2014 WL 3953637 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) (finding 
that disciplinary use had a different purpose than blogger’s purpose of exposing alleged courtroom 
corruption). 
41. Swatch Grp., 756 F.3d at 85 (copy of recording of Swatch conference call was fair use 
because news reporting purpose differed from information conveying purpose of Swatch’s 
speakers). 
42. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., 
Warren Publ’g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (similar holding for works of 
artist who illustrated many pulp fiction covers). 
43. Caner v. Autry, No. 6:14-CV-00004, 2014 WL 2002835 (W.D. Va. May 14, 2014) (videos of 
plaintiff posted to expose his alleged lies were transformative fair use). 
44. Katz v. Chevaldina, No. 12-22211-CIV-KING, 2014 WL 2815496 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2014), 
report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-22211-CV, 2014 WL 4385690 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 
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In some ways these cases are even more interesting from the 
perspective of transformativeness because the database cases involved 
the creation of a resource that wouldn’t otherwise exist. The databases 
emerged out of the contributions of many individual components, each 
of which has relatively little value to the overall purpose on its own. By 
contrast, the individual copying cases recognized transformation in 
context-shifting alone, without immersing one work in a flow of many 
others. In fact, the Swatch Group Management Services v. Bloomberg, 
L.P.45 opinion, which approved as transformative a news outlet’s posting 
of the audio of a business earnings call, was even amended after 
issuance to make clear that this shift in purpose was itself 
transformative.46 That even selective copying is doing rather well 
indicates that courts are open to recognizing many types of 
transformative purposes. 
Transformative purpose, in general, seems to mean that a defendant 
has a different interpretive or communicative project than the plaintiff 
did in creating the original work. A work created by a creative 
photographer in order to depict a person (or a house) can thus have its 
purpose changed by a news story about the photo, or by a database 
whose goal is to allow searchers to find lots of different pictures 
associated with particular keywords.47 A poster designed to promote a 
concert by the Grateful Dead can have its purpose changed by a book 
chronicling the history of the band.48 Although no communication is 
univocal given the variety of interpretive positions held by audiences, 
courts have proven willing to find transformative purpose based on 
objective characteristics of a particular defendant’s use, such as its 
inclusion within a broader context. Swatch is perhaps a pure example of 
context change, because the context there was not that the work was 
embedded within a larger news story, nor that it was part of a database 
of similar works, but that it was reposted in full by a news organization 
that existed to disseminate information.49 By contrast, the plaintiff-
2014) (headshot used in article critical of subject was transformative fair use); Dhillon v. Does 1-10, 
No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 WL 722592 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (same). 
45. Swatch Grp., 756 F.3d 73. 
46. See Andy Sellars, The (Non)Finality of a Fair Use Opinion, CYBERLAW CLINIC: HARV. L. 
SCH., BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://cyberlawclinic.berkman.harvard.edu/2015/02/23/fairuse/ (discussing the meaning of the 
amended opinion). 
47. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
48. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006). 
49. Swatch Grp., 756 F.3d at 85. 
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owner in Swatch created the work to promote its own non-copyright 
financial interests by reassuring investors of its economic viability.50 
Even in a world where creators have multiple aims, these particular 
purposes can be readily distinguished. 
The major fair use loss in the category of selective copying without 
alteration, the University of Georgia e-reserves case, involved a lawsuit 
against the university for allowing sometimes significant portions of 
books and articles to be placed on electronic reserve for courses.51 While 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepted that some use would be 
fair, it ordered the district court to reconsider its findings by making a 
more case-by-case analysis.52 The litigation featured an arguably 
unnecessary concession by the university that its copies for use by 
students were nontransformative, and thus does not represent a full 
exception to transformativeness’ current reign.53 
There is one more case that cuts against the “triumph of 
transformative purpose” narrative. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. 
Holdings, Inc.54 found that a news monitoring service that downloaded 
articles from the internet and allowed keyword searching was not 
transformative because it “use[d] its computer programs to automatically 
capture and republish designated segments of text from news articles, 
without adding any commentary or insight in its New Reports.”55 The 
Meltwater court acknowledged that allowing users “to sift through the 
deluge of data available through the Internet and to direct them to the 
original source . . . . would appear to be a transformative purpose.” But 
the defendant didn’t offer “evidence that Meltwater News customers 
actually use[d] its service to improve their access to the underlying news 
stories that are excerpted in its news feed,” and thus it failed to show that 
its service was actually used to transform the original news story into a 
datapoint that told a broader story about the overall news reporting 
industry.56 Thus, Meltwater—which arguably is now undermined by 
50. Id. 
51. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999) (ruling that abstracts and 
rough translations of Japanese copyrighted content were not transformative). 
52. Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1283. 
53. See Brandon Butler, Transformative Teaching and Educational Fair Use After Georgia State, 
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2568936. 
54. 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
55. Id. at 552; see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998) (allowing 
dial-in subscribers to listen to live radio over the phone wasn’t fair use). 
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subsequent Second Circuit precedent in Swatch and HathiTrust in any 
event—does not represent a significant loss for purpose-
transformativeness. 
In fact, even historically, copying an entire work wasn’t so bad for a 
fair use finding. Barton Beebe’s empirical study of fair use cases from 
1978–2005 found that “[o]f the 99 opinions that addressed facts in which 
the defendant took the entirety of the plaintiff’s work, 27.3% found fair 
use.”57 And this wasn’t much different from the overall rate of fair use 
findings.58 For all the headline-grabbing power of the full copying cases, 
then, they don’t represent a comprehensive redefinition of fair use 
(though it’s true that the scale of copying in these newer cases is often 
larger than that in older cases, because of the technological 
developments that produced the newer cases).59 
Meanwhile, alteration and partial copying are also succeeding using 
theories about transformed purpose and, in particular, transformed 
meaning, but with less certainty.60 The most commented-on of these is 
surely Cariou v. Prince,61 where the Second Circuit blessed most of 
appropriation artist Richard Prince’s copying from a photographer who 
found his relatively unsuccessful images of Jamaican men converted into 
hundred-thousand-dollar works celebrated by the likes of Beyoncé.62 
Cariou featured disagreement among the various judges about whether 
56. Meltwater, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 544; see also Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., No. 13 
Civ. 5315 AKH, 2014 WL 4444043, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) (adopting this analysis to 
distinguish the TVEyes service). 
57. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 616 (2008). 
58. Id. at 575–76. 
59. See BUTLER, supra note 26, at 3 (“Myth: Fair use case law has developed in a disturbing new 
direction in certain courts, or in recent years. . . . Fact: Fair use as applied by courts has evolved into 
a clear, coherent, unified doctrine. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that over nearly 20 years 
courts have moved decisively away from a series of confusing and contradictory rules of thumb 
focused on market harm and toward an emphasis on transformative purpose under the first factor.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
60. Compare, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013) (use of altered 
image in music video was transformative); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 
687 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming a finding of fair use on a motion to dismiss given the clarity of the 
transformation, a parody); Arrow Prods., LTD. v. Weinstein Co., 44 F. Supp. 3d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 25, 2014) (recreation of four scenes from movie was fair use), and Northland Family Planning 
Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972, 982–93 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (re-
edited video critiquing original video was fair use), with Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 
2010) (use of Holden Caulfield in quasi-ironic sequel was likely nontransformative), and Warner 
Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (encyclopedia of Harry 
Potter was insufficiently transformative given amount of exact copying involved). 
61. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
62. Id. at 709. 
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the meaning or message of Prince’s works so obviously differed from 
the meaning or message of Cariou’s as to justify summary judgment.63 
By contrast, the pure copying purpose-transformation cases discussed 
above have not produced such divided findings. Moreover, by finding 
five of the images at issue not physically altered enough to qualify as 
transformative fair use for purposes of summary judgment, the majority 
in Cariou suggested that merely directing a work at the market for 
appropriation art wasn’t necessarily enough for transformativeness.64 At 
least when the markets were close enough, a significant change in 
content seemed necessary as well. At the same time, Cariou recognized 
the relevance of interpretive communities: if a particular community, 
such as the world of “high art,” perceives a work as having a new 
meaning or message, the court should find transformativeness even if the 
court itself is not sure what’s going on.65 
The Copyright Office has also recognized various types of content-
transformativeness as fair use in its ruling on exemptions to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act’s prohibition on circumventing access 
controls, such as the access protection on DVDs.66 These exemptions 
must be re-examined every three years. In 2009, remix artists—
represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the 
OTW—for the first time sought exemptions for remix video, and have 
continued to participate in the exemption process. Both in 2009 and 
2012, the Office found that significant numbers of noncommercial 
remixes were fair use: they took parts of an existing work and used them 
to comment on or criticize the work itself, or on some other aspect of the 
world.67 The representatives of large copyright industries who opposed 
63. See id. at 706–07 (majority opinion); id. at 712–13 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
64. See id. at 711 (majority opinion). 
65. See Jonathan Francis, On Appropriation: Cariou v. Prince and Measuring Contextual 
Transformation in Fair Use, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 681, 693 (2014) (discussing Cariou’s 
recognition of interpretive communities). See generally Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is 
Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2008) (exploring the 
issues surrounding interpretive communities); Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair 
Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW & LIT. 20 (2013) (arguing in favor of recognizing 
multiplicity of meanings to different communities); Michael W. Tyszko, Whose Expression Is It, 
Anyway? Why “New Expression, Meaning, or Message” Should Consider All Reasonably Available 
Viewpoints, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 221 (2014) (advocating adoption of multiple reasonable 
viewpoints). 
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
67. See MARIA A. PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS, SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: FIFTH TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE 
EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION 127–28 (Oct. 2012); Memorandum from 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington, Librarian of Cong. 66–68 (June 
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the current remix exemption proposal have essentially conceded the 
point. Though they offered pro forma arguments that remixes weren’t 
generally fair use, they also did not oppose the existing exemptions for 
remix and argued that the exemptions should only be renewed in their 
2012 form, not expanded.68 
Not all changes create content-transformativeness: for example, a new 
episode of Gilligan’s Island wouldn’t be identical to previous episodes, 
but the different ways in which Gilligan bollixed a new attempt to leave 
the island wouldn’t necessarily change the meaning or message of the 
work.69 By contrast, Jonathan McIntosh’s remix in which Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer confronts Twilight’s Edward Cullen, exposing him as a 
creepy stalker, uses Buffy as a tool of critique and Twilight as the subject 
of that critique.70 Both of these uses give new meanings to the existing 
works, and thus the resulting content is transformative. 
While purpose-transformativeness has the appeal of protecting 
copiers whose projects are opposed or orthogonal to the original authors’ 
aims—broadly speaking, using the original works as evidence or as bits 
of a larger mosaic—content-transformativeness has its own merit. 
Content-transformativeness sets up the specifically authorial claims of 
people who are making transformative works as equal, or not 
subordinate to, the claims of other authors. Thus, both kinds of 
transformativeness are important to current doctrine. 
There is also one significant nontransformative fair use success: 
copying for the benefit of print-disabled library patrons in HathiTrust.71 
In that case, libraries’ copies were for the same purpose as the original: 
allowing the works to be read, albeit read in accessible formats (large 
print, pages that did not need to be turned by hand, or other converted 
11, 2010) (regarding recommendation of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2008-8 and rulemaking 
on exemptions from prohibition on circumvention of copyright protection systems for access control 
technologies). 
68. Joint Creators & Copyright Owners, Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 
17 U.S.C. 1201 (Proposed Class #7), at 2–3, available at http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-
032715/class%207/Joint_Creators_and_Copyright_Owners_class07_1201_2014.pdf (detailing lack 
of opposition to existing exemptions but claiming that remixes are generally infringing); Comments 
of the DVD Copy Control Association (“DVD CCA”) on Proposed Class 7, at 2, 3–8, available at 
http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class%207/DVDCCA_class07_1201_2014.pdf 
(same). 
69. But cf. Adjmi v. DLT Entm’t Ltd., No. 14 Civ.568 (LAP), 2015 WL 1499575 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
31, 2015) (finding a playwright’s dark rewriting of Three’s Company, a lighthearted 1970s sitcom, 
to be transformative fair use). 
70. See Jonathan McIntosh, Buffy vs. Edward: Twilight Remixed, REBELLIOUS PIXELS (June 20, 
2009), http://www.rebelliouspixels.com/2009/buffy-vs-edward-twilight-remixed. 
71. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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formats depending on patrons’ needs) because the audience couldn’t 
read the original.72 Although the court deemed this purpose 
nontransformative, it was nonetheless fair use because copyright owners 
had consistently declined to develop a licensing market for such uses.73 
Thus, the access benefits outweighed any potential lost market, which by 
all indications was never going to materialize regardless.74 
Ultimately, however, there is general consensus that “the 
transformative use paradigm, as adopted in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
overwhelmingly drives fair use analysis in the courts today.”75 Use as a 
datapoint, as evidence, or as a starting point for some substantive 
reworking offering new meanings will all justify a transformativeness 
finding, and therefore usually a fair use finding. There’s less consensus 
that this variety within transformativeness is a good idea. 
III. THE CRITICS 
Fair use’s alleged uncertainty, addressed in Part I, isn’t its only 
failing, according to its critics. As Congress, the Copyright Office, and 
even the Patent and Trademark Office start to consider possible revision 
of the Copyright Act, and as other nations examine the U.S. model of 
fair use as part of reconsidering their own exceptions and limitations, 
some people have warned that current judicial interpretations of fair use 
are far too broad. These critics are attempting to push the pendulum back 
towards restrictive interpretations and even to suggest that our current 
case law may violate our obligations under the Berne Convention.76 
While I hope they fail, their arguments against a broad and flexible fair 
use doctrine are worth addressing. 
72. Id. at 101. 
73. Id. at 103. 
74. Id.  
75. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][b] (2013) 
(stating that transformative has become a shorthand for fair, and not transformative has become a 
shorthand for not fair); Neil Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 
734 (2011); see also Beebe, supra note 57, at 605–06. 
76. Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain 
Compliance with International Norms — Part II (Fair Use) 3 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 503, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539178 (“The potential disparities 
between the U.S. fair use exception and the three-step test have long attracted the attention of 
scholars. . . . U.S. authorities could reasonably contend that, in practice, courts’ actual application of 
the exception remained consonant with international standards. Recent U.S. fair use decisions, 
however may challenge the credibility of that assertion.” (footnote omitted)); The Scope of Fair 
Use, supra note 27 (statement of June M. Besek, Executive Director of the Kernochan Center for 
Law, Media and the Arts and Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law School) (making the same 
argument). 
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At recent congressional hearings on fair use, for example, 
representatives of the large copyright industries such as book and music 
publishing cautioned that courts have found fair use in too many cases.77 
They had no enthusiasm for congressional intervention into the guts of 
the Copyright Act at this time, given that they’d likely have to trade 
some consumer-friendly reforms for any statutory change cutting back 
on fair use, but they wished to put a public marker down on what they 
considered unacceptable. 
June Besek, at Columbia’s Kernochan Center, argued both before 
Congress and at a Copyright Office roundtable that fair use has 
expanded to the point that some copyright provisions are now 
“meaningless”78 and that fair use has become too defendant-favorable.79 
For example, she believed that HathiTrust (then on appeal from a fair 
use ruling by the district court) mistakenly found fair use in university 
libraries’ mass digitization of works, because that made the library-
specific exemptions of Section 108 irrelevant.80 These exceptions are 
both broader than fair use in some respects and narrower in others; the 
Second Circuit easily rejected an argument based on Section 108, which 
explicitly does not interfere with fair use.81 I raise Besek’s point not to 
agree with it, but to illustrate her concern that fair use is protecting 
conduct that Congress otherwise chose not to protect. 
Professor Jane Ginsburg, a longstanding copyright expansionist 
whose views are always worth serious consideration, has turned her 
attention outwards. It may be too late for us, but perhaps other nations 
can be warned off of our current fair use path, and possibly even provide 
77. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 6–7 (testimony of Kurt Wimmer, General 
Counsel, Newspaper Association of America) (arguing that Congress should keep its hands off, but 
that “some courts’ recent willingness to give undue weight to the concept of ‘transformative use’ in 
connection with the first fair-use factor risks eroding fundamental copyright protections.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
78. Orphan Works and Mass Digitization Roundtables, LIBRARY OF CONG. 39 (Mar. 10, 2014), 
available at http://copyright.gov/orphan/transcript/0310LOC.pdf (statement of June Besek) (“I’ve 
said that fair use has incredibly expanded over the past several years and I think it’s expanded to the 
point that it is distorting the law. It’s sort of taken over some of the other exceptions. . . . I think 
essentially fair use has made some provisions simply meaningless . . . .”). 
79. The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 12 (statement of June M. Besek). 
80. Id. at 10. 
81. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 94 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Plaintiffs argue that 
the fair use defense is inapplicable to the activities at issue here, because the Copyright Act includes 
another section, 108, which governs ‘Reproduction [of copyrighted works] by Libraries . . .’ 17 
U.S.C. § 108. However, section 108 also includes a ‘savings clause,’ which states, ‘Nothing in this 
section in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107 . . . .’ § 108(f)(4). Thus, 
we do not construe § 108 as foreclosing our analysis of the Libraries’ activities under fair use, and 
we proceed with that analysis.”). 
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some pressure to turn us back in the other direction. Both in a “Letter 
from the US”82 and in a submission to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission with her colleagues,83 Professor Ginsburg set out her 
concerns with the growing—in her view, metastasizing—scope of fair 
use. 
One primary criticism of transformativeness from Ginsburg and 
others identifies a conflict between the concept of “transformation” in 
fair use doctrine and the derivative works right, which in the statute’s 
language allows the copyright owner to claim rights in works that are 
“transformed” as well as “adapted.”84 Thus, it could be difficult to tell 
which works ought to be deemed infringing derivative works and which 
protected fair uses.85 Content-transformativeness, Ginsburg suggests, 
“makes fair use even more indeterminate and unpredictable than before 
(some level of indeterminacy and unpredictability being inherent to the 
flexibility that is the hallmark of fair use), because 
‘transformativenes[s]’ may be entirely in the eye of the judicial 
beholder.”86 
A recent Seventh Circuit case, Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC,87 
echoed Ginsburg’s concerns. Kienitz involved the use of a photo of the 
82. See Ginsburg, supra note 76. 
83. Besek, Ginsburg, & Loengard, supra note 25. 
84. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “derivative work”). 
85. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 8–10 (statement of June M. Besek) 
(arguing that post-Campbell cases have inappropriately contracted the derivative works right); 2 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.49 (3d ed. 2005 & 2007 Supp.) (“On principle, 
the rule [weighing transformativeness in favor of fair use] threatens to undermine the balance that 
Congress struck in section 106(2)’s derivative rights provision to give copyright owners exclusive 
control over transformative works to the extent these works borrow copyrightable expression from 
the copyrighted work.”); Reese, supra note 1, at 468 (“The rise of transformativeness as an explicit, 
and important, aspect of fair use analysis obviously has potential implications for the copyright 
owner’s exclusive right . . . to prepare derivative works . . . , since derivative works seem, by 
definition, to involve some transformation of the underlying work.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright 
and Intermediate Users’ Rights, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 67, 69–71 (1999); Jeremy Kudon, 
Form Over Function: Expanding the Transformative Use Test for Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. REV. 579, 
592–93 (2000); Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use 
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 720–21 (1995); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of 
Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 126–27 (2001). But see Pamela 
Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 
1505 (2013) (setting forth a framework for properly defining the derivative works right without a 
conflict with fair use). 
86. Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 21; see also Francis, supra note 65, at 682 (“This reliance on 
physical alteration leaves a creator unsure of just how much alteration is needed before a court will 
find her new work has altered the original’s expression sufficiently to manifest new and different 
meaning.”). 
87. 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).  
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mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, a formerly hard-partying student at the 
university there who now wanted to control students’ exuberance (and 
drunkenness).88 A local business removed the background of the photo, 
posterized and colored the image of the mayor’s face, and put it on a T-
shirt with the phrase “sorry for partying.”89 The photographer sued, and 
the court of appeals affirmed a finding of fair use, but only after 
criticizing transformativeness.90 
The Kienitz court commented that transformativeness doesn’t appear 
in the Copyright Act, though the Supreme Court “mentioned” it in 
Campbell, which is like downplaying Article III courts as merely 
“mentioned” in the Constitution.91 The court then expressed its 
“skeptic[ism]” about prioritizing transformativeness over the plain text 
of the statute because of the potential effect of transformativeness on the 
derivative works right: 
To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely to say 
that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under 
§ 106(2). Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do 
not explain how every “transformative use” can be “fair use” 
without extinguishing the author’s rights under § 106(2).92 
Instead, the court decided to “stick with the statutory list,” and the 
most important factor was the fourth, market effect, which ultimately 
favored fair use.93 (This interpretive re-prioritizing of Supreme Court 
decisions by a court of appeals is a kind of “underruling.”94) 
Unfortunately, Kienitz doesn’t tell us what the first fair use factor 
does attempt to privilege and deprivilege, if not transformativeness. 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit used its own test, worded in the language of 
economics: “whether the contested use is a complement to the protected 
work (allowed) rather than a substitute for it (prohibited).”95 Where this 
concept appears in the Copyright Act is left as an exercise for the reader. 
More importantly, the complement/substitute opposition requires some 




92. Id. at 758. 
93. Id. 
94. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variation on the Themes of Robert 
M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 82 (1989) (arguing that “when push comes to 
shove, the [lower court] judge may . . . . in effect, ‘overrule’ (or, perhaps a better term, given the 
relationships of the courts, ‘underrule’) [lawless precedent]”). 
95. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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baseline for understanding the appropriate scope of the copyright right—
the markets to which copyright owners are entitled—just as 
transformativeness does. 
I obviously disagree with Ginsburg and with Kienitz: 
Transformativeness is a flexible standard for identifying uses with new 
meanings, messages, or purposes outside of the bounds the copyright 
owner reasonably deserves to control. Transformativenesss doesn’t make 
all derivative works into fair uses, and the Second Circuit in Cariou 
didn’t purport to reject prior case law so finding.96 And, as noted above 
in Part II, fair use has sufficient predictability to serve as the basis for 
action in many cases. 
Indeed, to the extent that fair use’s critics like fair use at all, it is for 
content-transformativeness: uses that create new creative works.97 And 
it’s this somewhat conflicted relationship with content-
transformativeness that leads to one of the most interesting features of 
the new criticism of transformativeness: Transformative purpose, though 
it makes copyright expansionists see red, simply doesn’t pose the same 
conceptual conflict with the derivative works right as transformative 
content. As Professor Reese’s careful analysis established, courts finding 
fair use transformativeness were relatively uninterested in whether a 
defendant’s use transformed a plaintiff’s work in the sense of creating a 
derivative work.98 Courts did not use the creation of a derivative work as 
evidence of transformative fairness, nor were they using the fact of mere 
reproduction as evidence of unfairness.99 As noted in Part II, that pattern 
has, if anything, only intensified. Thus, fears about the overlap between 
transformativeness and derivative works—including mine100—were 
overstated. 
Instead, the database and historical uses that have been protected by 
the pure transformative purpose line of cases involve the creation of 
allegedly infringing reproductions, not allegedly infringing derivative 
works. As pure copies, they can’t conflict with the derivative works 
96. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
Indeed, in its recent Salinger opinion, the Second Circuit endorsed a disturbingly narrow 
characterization of content-transformativeness, suggesting that a novel that followed an older, 
broken-down Holden Caulfield was not transformative or fair. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 
83 (2d Cir. 2010). 
97. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 14 (statement of June M. Besek) (noting 
that fair use’s “most appropriate role” is “fostering new authorship”); MANNE & MORRIS, supra 
note 25, at 15 (suggesting that fair use is supposed to encourage the creation of “derivative works”). 
98. Reese, supra note 1, at 484, 494. 
99. Id. 
100. See Tushnet, supra note 10, at 555–60. 
 
                                                     
14 - Tushnet.doc (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:32 PM 
888 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:869 
right. Yet fair use’s critics oppose the transformative purpose cases such 
as HathiTrust and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,101 which found 
that creating thumbnail images for use in online image search was fair 
use,102 with even more fervor.103 For example, rather than regarding 
purpose as something that can legitimately be transformed, Ginsburg 
argues that these cases actually rest on false premises that certain 
beneficial uses deserve a subsidy from copyright owners and that a 
market failure prevents a licensing regime from emerging to allow these 
beneficial uses.104 The inapplicability of the “overlap with derivative 
works” criticism to the database cases reveals that Ginsburg and her 
colleagues’ real disagreement lies with fair use’s strength, not with its 
alleged conceptual fuzziness.105 
Other criticisms of transformativeness are equally awkward as applied 
to the database cases. For example, some have complained that cases 
like Cariou leave transformativeness in the eye of the beholder, who 
might perceive a new meaning or message based on any change—or 
not.106 But how does the meaning or message of a database appear to a 
reasonable observer, compared to the meaning or message of a single 
work? It seems a very weird question even to ask. No matter one’s 
interpretive community, the two seem like very different types of 
communicative objects. 
Relatedly, Reese asks a number of cogent questions about the 
101. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
102. Id. 
103. See, e.g., The Scope of Fair Use, supra note 27, at 5, 8 (statement of June M. Besek) 
(criticizing application of transformativeness to complete copies or “functional transformation”); cf. 
Kathleen K. Olson, Transforming Fair Use Online: The Ninth Circuit’s Productive-Use Analysis of 
Visual Search Engines, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 153, 167 (2009) (while supporting the outcomes in 
such fair use cases, calling purpose-transformativeness an “absurd conception of transformative 
use”). 
104. See Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 4; Jonathan Band, The Future of Fair Use After Google 
Books, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/ 
intellectual-property/021114-the-future-of-fair-use-after-google-books/ (describing criticisms of 
lawyer Jon Baumgarten that the new approach to purpose-transformativeness merely asks if the new 
use was socially beneficial). 
105. See Laura Quilter, Fair Use Week—How Parodies Transformed Fair Use, COPYRIGHT & 
INFO. POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015), http://blogs.umass.edu/lquilter/2015/02/23/fair-use-week-how-
parodies-transformed-fair-use/ (“[T]he criticisms are less about whether the doctrine is correct or 
not, and more a complaint that the concept has been too successful.”). 
106. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 711 (2d Cir. 2013) (“What is critical is how the work in 
question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say about a particular 
piece or body of work.”); cf. Andrew Gilden & Timothy Greene, Fair Use for the Rich and 
Fabulous?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 88, 98–100 (2013) (criticizing Cariou’s reasoning as 
unduly malleable). 
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meaning of “purpose” that simply seem easier to answer in the mass 
copying cases. As he notes, the court has to have some sense of the 
plaintiff’s purpose to determine whether the defendant’s purpose is 
transformative.107 Whether the appropriate standard is subjective (what 
the author actually had in mind) or objective (what reasonable authors of 
this type of work would have in mind), and whether or not courts 
recognize multiple authorial purposes,108 “I intend to create a database of 
lots of works” is rarely if ever going to be a plausible purpose for the 
creator of an individual work, or even for any transferee. Even if the 
author intends database-type use, once the author sees that doing so is 
possible,109 she can’t do it on her own as long as there’s more than one 
copyright owner in the world. This makes the author’s claim to 
encompass the “big data” purpose less plausible.110 
Indeed, the conceptual argument against content-transformativeness 
seems to be more persuasive, at least on a case-by-case basis, than the 
argument against purpose-transformativeness as applied to large-scale 
uses that generate benefits that individual, unaggregated works couldn’t. 
Thus, a recent article on fair use cases quoted Professor Lateef Mtima 
calling content-transformativeness cases “a snake pit” because of courts’ 
need to judge the aesthetics of any transformation.111 Others expressed 
the opinion that courts were likely to move the pendulum back against 
fair use, with 2014 likely to mark its furthest extension.112 But even 
though key 2014 cases were purpose-transformative cases, 
107. Reese, supra note 1, at 494; see also Bunker & Calvert, supra note 12, at 121–25 (arguing 
that defining purpose is unstable in individual-copying cases).  
108. Reese, supra note 1, at 494–95. 
109. Id. at 495. 
110. Professor Thomas Cotter disagrees, arguing that any author’s purpose can be described at a 
sufficient level of abstraction that the parties’ purposes will be the same. Thomas F. Cotter, 
Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 701, 721 (2010). For 
example, both the individual photographer and the image search engine intend to provide 
information. I find this unpersuasive; even Cotter has to concede that the “immediate” purpose of 
the parties’ endeavors differs in mass copying cases, id., and I don’t see evidence that courts are 
more incoherent about purpose-transformation than they are about anything else. (Transformation’s 
role in right of publicity cases is a different matter.) Moreover, if we said “the author intends to 
license her work for database use,” even if “licensing” were not an empty abstraction rather than a 
purpose, that still wouldn’t be the same as the database creator’s purpose of making a database 
through aggregation. 
111. Anandashankar Mazumdar, Digital-Age Strain on Copyrights Continues; Action Coming 
from Courts Not Congress, 20 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 121 (Jan. 28, 2015); cf. N.J. Media 
Grp., Inc. v. Pirro, No. 13 CIV. 7153 ER, 2015 WL 542258, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015) (finding 
that incorporation of a photo of 9/11 firefighters into a viral meme comparing them to Marines 
raising the flag at Iwo Jima was arguably nontransformative). 
112. Mazumdar, supra note 111 (quoting Professors Zahr Said and Roger Schecter). 
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prognosticators predicted retrenchment in content-transformativeness: 
Professor Roger Schechter argued that “the ascension of the concept of 
transformative use has ‘seriously cut back’ on the copyright holder’s 
rights of adaptation and preparation of derivative works,” and 
library/tech industry lawyer Jonathan Band also thought that plaintiff 
victories would come “more with the appropriation art cases or 
something like that,” based on the conflict with the derivative works 
right.113 Band continued: “But in the tech cases, where you don’t see the 
copies—like the HathiTrust case or the Google case . . . . what’s 
transformative is that you’re making a database for a different purpose—
search,” and he predicted that those cases would remain untouched.114 
Individualized determinations about content-transformativeness do 
seem likely to remain more hard-fought and contextual than the 
orthogonal purposes approved in the pure copying cases, which may be 
ironic from the perspective of the critics, but only to be expected in an 
area of law subject to ideological drift. It’s in content-transformativeness 
that we have the most significant questions to ask about the roles of 
differing interpretive communities in identifying transformed meaning. 
But, in order to preserve equal freedom of interpretation for all such 
communities, whether federal judges are part of them or not, it is vital to 
recognize that different audiences may take different meanings from the 
same work, so that what seems like a critical transformation to one 
group may seem trivial to another. Where the target audience would find 
new meanings or messages, courts should recognize content-
transformativeness even if they (or I) don’t see it. Narrower alternatives, 
such as those suggested by fair use’s critics, run too much risk of 
suppressing speakers who don’t speak in a language familiar to the 
court.115 
The relatively new epistemological humility expressed in cases such 
as Cariou is a welcome respite from what Zahr Said has characterized as 
formalism in the mode of New Criticism, in which judges treat works as 
having only one correct meaning.116 Abandoning certainty about the true 
meaning of a work—whether that work is the plaintiff’s or the 
113. Id. 
114. Id. (quoting Jonathan Band). 
115. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one 
extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. . . . until the public had learned 
the new language in which their author spoke.”). 
116. See Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 13–16 (July 26, 2014), available at 
ssrn.com/abstract=2472500. 
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defendant’s—is uncomfortable, especially for judges trained to fix 
meaning whenever possible. People have always fought over the 
meaning of texts, though, and advocates for broad fair use protections 
will have to continue that fight when it comes to transformed content, no 
matter how entrenched the pure copying/transformative purpose cases 
become as a matter of copyright doctrine. 
IV. WHAT’S NEXT? 
The present ideal behind the criticism of transformativeness is pretty 
much the same as it has always been: There should be an authorized 
market for every copy.117 Unauthorized productive uses, or unauthorized 
transformative uses, aren’t, in general, justified, given owners’ interest 
in control.118 Exceptions and limitations should be highly constrained, 
ideally for listed purposes like comment, news reporting, and criticism. 
In addition, copyright owners should have strong moral rights, limited 
only as a last resort. 
For those who find this vision unattractive, transformative use is a 
good alternative. Transformativeness, despite its potential ambiguities, 
has the capacity to recognize the uses that we find valuable and that we 
believe copyright owners shouldn’t control. When high-protectionists 
argue that fair use is too broad, and that uses that should be controlled by 
copyright owners are escaping control, transformativeness provides 
ways to respond. When copyright owners make incentive and moral 
rights claims based on authorial labor, transformativeness has incentive-
based and desert-based responses. Transformative uses generally involve 
the addition of labor to create value, whether that labor is in building an 
interpretive scaffold around a work, changing the work to send a 
different message, or putting the work together with numerous other 
117. See Jessica D. Litman, Fetishizing Copies, in RUTH OKEDIJI, COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 3–4 (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2506867 (“Copy-fetish has persuaded others that fair use has somehow run amok because 
copyright owners are losing lawsuits that they would probably never have brought if they didn’t feel 
obliged to protect themselves from all unlicensed copies.”); id. at 18 (“Copy-fetishists have 
demonstrated that they view the mere existence of any unlicensed copy as an invasion of their 
prerogatives. In the HathiTrust case, the Authors Guild was willing to spend millions of dollars in 
an effort to ensure that even invisible unlicensed copies were eradicated.”); MANNE & MORRIS, 
supra note 25, at 12, 16 (arguing that licensing should supplant fair use whenever possible). 
118. See, e.g., Written Comments of Copyright Clearance Center Inc., COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE 
CENTER 2–4 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/copyright_clearance_ 
center_comments.pdf (arguing that rights should generally be entirely exclusive and all uses should 
be licensed); Comments of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, NAT’L 
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. 9–10 (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/ 
ascap_comments.pdf (arguing that essentially all uses of music should be licensed). 
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works in order to search across them. The defendant’s labor is of the 
kind that the original copyright owner generally couldn’t or wouldn’t 
perform. No book’s copyright owner has the ability to code a Google-
style database; Swatch would never create objective reporting on its own 
economic prospects; abortion clinics wouldn’t allow uses of their videos 
to condemn abortion. 
I believe these cases were rightly decided, even if having an 
expansive fair use doctrine means that its contours will never be defined 
down to the microscopic level. In American law, there is rarely if ever a 
doctrine defined sufficiently to be one hundred percent predictable. Fair 
use doesn’t need to be perfect to do its job—like parenting, it just has to 
be good enough. 
After a long time, fair use has finally adapted to the relatively new, 
higher default level of copyright protection.119 In the process, its public 
persona has changed, from a ninety-pound weakling to a mixed martial 
arts champion with a number of different strengths. Both in practices 
outside the courts and in fair use findings, flexibility has replaced 
uncertainty; the same statutory factors look different in new political and 
social circumstances. Given the variety of circumstances in which 
copyright law now operates, we shouldn’t be surprised that there are also 
different clusters of fair uses, including both pure copying and 
alterations. This diversity is fair use’s strength, not its weakness. 
 
119. See Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651 (2015). 
 
                                                     
